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(Translated by Margarita Pillado)
In the last thirty years, Spanish society has experienced a radical 
transformation that few would have dared to predict in light of the 
conflictive record of the country’s past. In a very short time and 
with few internal disruptions, Spain broke free from the centuries-
old bondage of endemic civil strife and social inequality, dissipated 
the repressive atmosphere of authoritarianism, and embraced a 
Constitution that granted broad political freedoms and recognized 
the cultural and linguistic diversity of its people. Moreover, with its 
modern infrastructure, strong investments abroad, and a dynamic 
economy that attracts millions of foreign immigrants, Spain has 
become an important player in the economic landscape of the Eu-
ropean Union, and is a peer among countries that a few decades 
ago seemed unreachable models of progress and social welfare. One 
cannot but echo the conclusion of a recent report on Spain by the 
British publication The Economist: “over the past 30 years few other 
places have been as successful” (20). To a significant extent, this suc-
cess is due to the Constitution of 1978.1 
The referendum that validated the Constitution (the culmi-
nation of an impressive effort to redefine the nation after Franco’s 
death) was the first indication that perhaps the dream of several 
generations of Spanish liberals—routinely silenced, executed, or up-
rooted into exile since the return of Ferdinand VII in 1814 —finally 
had become a reality. Indeed, it is possible to affirm that the Consti-
tution of 1978 reproduces in spirit the Cadiz Constitution of 1812, 
as well as all the liberal legislation that ensued. And although the 
former does not make explicit reference to its immediate predeces-
sor, the Constitution of 1931, “a comparison of the two texts would 
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show that some of the drafters of the 1978 Constitution had the 
earlier text close at hand” (Balfour and Quiroga 45). The success-
ful implementation of a liberal legislative code in Spain was indeed 
surprising, not only because it happened with a minimum of social 
and political unrest, but also because the document received the 
explicit support of the immense majority of parliamentary groups, 
particularly, and enthusiastically, of the conservative forces that for 
centuries had been hostile to the very same ideas that it proclaims. 
Without a doubt, the conciliatory restraint the various political par-
ties exercised in the writing of the Constitution of 1978, giving up 
some of their customary demands in favor of a basic consensus, 
produced an inclusive Magna Carta that enjoys the support of the 
majority of the Spanish population today.
Having said that, it is paradoxical that despite Spain’s consider-
able successes, the image of the country still evokes negative feelings 
in a significant part of its population. Let us consider, for instance, 
the national symbols. In theory, according to the Constitution of 
1978, the flag and the national anthem represent all Spaniards, but 
in practice, these symbols are generally identified with conservative, 
if not fascist, groups. To explain this fact we must consider the coun-
try’s recent history. Even though the Constitution is informed by a 
progressive sensitivity that has inspired an open and tolerant soci-
ety, the symbols that define the Spanish nation are a slightly modi-
fied version of those associated with Franco’s regime, and clearly 
different from those in use during the Second Republic. Therefore, 
although in the last three decades Spain has managed to disassociate 
itself from tyranny and intolerance, its symbols (rather paradoxi-
cally) still have negative connotations of repression and fanaticism. 
Consequently, a Catalan socialist or a Basque communist, even if 
they feel Spanish, would rather attend a political rally with the flag 
of Catalonia or Euskadi instead of the national flag. The senyera or 
the ikurriña still evoke in them relatively recent memories of re-
sistance against Franco, whereas the national emblem continues to 
bear the stigma of its association with the dictator’s regime. To those 
familiar with the importance symbols have in the formation of a 
collective identity, the persistent identification of the Spanish flag 
with repression and authoritarianism represents an undoubtedly 
serious concern.
2
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The problem extends as well to the interpretation of history. 
Recently, there has been an abundant bibliography seeking to elu-
cidate the meaning of the concept of Spain as a historical entity. In 
books and periodicals, numerous authors have pondered the pos-
sible responses to the question: what is Spain, a nation of nations, a 
state, an ethno-patriotic entity? When was it born? Who and what 
should it include? What are its spatial and temporal borders? The 
answers to these questions are manifold and often contradictory, 
revealing internal tensions within Spanish society that, far from eas-
ing, seem to have gained strength in the last few years. History, as we 
know, is not innocent or disinterested. The question: what is Spain? 
is often understood as: what should it have been? or what would I 
like it to be in the future? In this regard, two critical issues  deserve 
further analysis: the various interpretations of Spain as a nation and 
the interrelationship between myth and history.
For several years, a growing number of studies on Spanish iden-
tity have assigned a central importance to the concept of nation, 
and, as Henry Kamen observes, the majority of them coincide with 
the idea that “the myth of Spain as a nation was born around 1808 or 
1812” (1). This is partly due to José Álvarez Junco’s influential the-
sis that Spanish resistance against French occupation represents the 
defining moment of the birth of the Spanish nation. According to 
him, Spanish liberals understood this rebellion against the invaders 
as the popular expression of a national will that would culminate in 
the writing of the Constitution of 1812. In Mater Dolorosa, Álvarez 
Junco affirms that the attitude of the intellectual elites towards the 
lower classes suffered a 180-degree turn after the start of the war in 
1808, and that this radical change of attitude was the crucial issue 
of the war (136). The popular uprising against the French proved to 
the Liberals “que el pueblo, preservado del ‘contagio’ cosmopolita 
gracias a la ‘falta de lectura’, había ‘salvado’ al país; y al oponer tan 
tenaz resistencia frente a Napoleón, España demostraba que era una 
nación” ‘that the people, preserved from the cosmopolitan “conta-
gion” thanks to their “lack of reading,” “saved” the country; and by 
opposing such stubborn resistance against Napoleon, Spain demon-
strated that it was indeed a nation’ (137). To substantiate his theory, 
Álvarez Junco mentions the case of Antonio de Capmany, who in 
his Centinela contra franceses (1808) warned his fellow Spaniards 
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against the danger of adopting French customs, and invited them 
to imitate the customs of the populace. In Capmany’s view, only ig-
norant people (because of their lack of exposure to French ideas) 
had managed to preserve unchanged the authentic traditions of the 
country (Álvarez Junco 136-37).
This interpretation, however, raises legitimate objections. First, 
the displacement of national identity onto the lower classes in Spain 
occurred a hundred years before the Napoleonic invasion, as a reac-
tion against the cultural “invasion” of French ideas and fashions. 
Since, in the eighteenth century, high culture was synonymous with 
French culture all over Europe, some members of the Spanish upper 
classes turned to the popular and marginal groups in search of “au-
thenticity”: the more marginalized the group, the better; the poorer 
and the more ignorant, the less exposed to French contagion. Works 
by Samaniego, Jovellanos, the duke of Almodóvar, Romea y Tapia, 
León de Arroyal, and Leandro Fernández de Moratín, document-
ed this trend, although, more often than not, to condemn it. In El 
deseo de seguidillas, a sainete by Ramón de la Cruz staged in 1769, 
one of the main characters maintains that, just as survivors of the 
Visigothic army took refuge in the mountains of Asturias after the 
Muslim invasion, so now Spaniards should move to the outskirts 
of the cities and follow the example of the lower classes to preserve 
authentic Spanish values and initiate a new Reconquest (118-19). A 
few years later, Capmany echoed those words in his Teatro histórico-
crítico de la eloquencia española (1786), suggesting the most authen-
tic representatives of a nation are not its scientists or writers, but 
the lower classes. As he explains, cultured elites tend to adopt fash-
ionable tastes and habits regardless of their origin, while the igno-
rant populace keeps its customs “constantes, uniformes y comunes” 
‘constant, uniform, and common’ (XCIX-C). 2 Capmany and de la 
Cruz represent those members of the Spanish upper classes who, 
as a reaction against French influence, depict the ignorant masses 
as representative of the most authentic Spanish values. The Spanish 
ilustrados, on the other hand, generally condemned this attitude as a 
manifestation of an unjustified and uncouth irrationality.3
Consequently, it is at least doubtful that the populace who rose 
against the French army in 1808 did so in the name of those princi-
ples of popular sovereignty that would later inspire the Constitution 
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of 1812, especially given the similarities between the Cadiz Consti-
tution and the Bayonne Statute inspired by Napoleon.4 Towards the 
end of the war, both liberals and conservatives endeavored to in-
terpret the struggle in the manner that best benefited their agenda: 
either as a sign that Spaniards were willing to die in defense of their 
liberties or as a heroic defense of the sacred traditions of their ances-
tors. In the end, it seems that the reactionary rhetoric of the clergy 
and other conservative groups made a stronger impression on the 
lower classes than the liberal discourse of civil liberties and free-
dom. The popular cry of “¡Vivan las caenas!” ‘Long live the chains!’ 
welcoming Ferdinand VII suggests that the liberal interpretation 
of the War of Independence as a fight for freedom may have been 
“un grandioso malentendido, origen de muchas de las decepciones 
que vinieron luego” ‘a magnificent misunderstanding, the origin of 
many disappointments that came afterwards’ (Álvarez Junco 144). 
A misunderstanding, however, that turned out to be extraordinarily 
fruitful, for even if it did not faithfully reflect contemporary reality, 
it initiated a rich tradition that served as a blueprint for all subse-
quent attempts to create a free and democratic society.
To establish the starting point of the Spanish nation between 
the years 1808 and 1812 creates the additional problem of leaving 
a broad temporal spectrum outside the field of study. What to do, 
then, with all those authors who in previous centuries expressed 
their belief of belonging to a nation called Spain?5 To address this 
question, some historians distinguish between ethno-patriotism 
and nationalism, but these categories have not always proved useful 
in practice. Henry Kamen, who accepts the year 1808 as the origin 
of the Spanish nation, warns it is perhaps “a mistake to restrict the 
rise of nations to the nineteenth century, because this arbitrarily 
excludes from our consideration a vast span of previous history in 
which the theme was certainly a relevant one and had an indisput-
able importance” (10).
A crucial issue lies in the definition of the concepts of nation 
and nationalism, a point of contention for many critics. While Liah 
Greenfeld maintains that there are two essential forms of national-
ism, civic or “individualistic-libertarian” and ethnic “or collectiv-
istic-authoritarian” (11), Benedict Anderson distinguishes between 
“nation-states” as products of the Enlightenment and “the nations 
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to which they give political expression,” whose origins are to be 
found in a remote past (11), and Anthony Smith identifies five basic 
approaches to the study of nations and nationalism: primordialism, 
perennialism, ethno-symbolism, modernism, and postmodernism 
(223-25). On the other hand, after acknowledging his skepticism 
towards a possible scientific definition of the term, Hugh Seton-
Watson concludes that “a nation exists when a significant number 
of people in the community consider themselves to form a nation, 
or behave as if they formed one” (5). It is not surprising that Balfour 
and Quiroga characterize the concept of nation, as “one of the most 
elusive in political science,” adding: “What constitutes a nation is 
the subject of wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory defini-
tions” (6). 
Faced with so many interpretations of the concept, critics usu-
ally choose the best suited for their purposes, which more often 
than not leads to an unproductive circularity. For instance, Juan 
Pablo Fusi, whose objective is to prove that Spain has to be under-
stood as a European variable, suggests that it was the centralism of 
the Bourbons that would end up creating the sense of nation (130). 
Similarly, Álvarez Junco, who wants to imbue the idea of Spain with 
liberal connotations, resorts to the concepts of ethnic patriotism 
and nationalism to argue that the Spanish nation began its historical 
journey when Spaniards revolted against Napoleon and the repre-
sentatives to the Courts of Cadiz embraced popular sovereignty as 
the fundamental principle of the Constitution of 1812. Juan Sinisio 
Pérez Garzón takes this argument to its logical extreme, by pointing 
to the numerous similarities between the Cadiz Constitution and 
the Bayonne Statute, to conclude that the birth of the Spanish na-
tion, understood as “the liberal nation,” was decisively conditioned 
by the legislative activity of the French invaders and their Spanish 
supporters (413).6
At this point, it is necessary to acknowledge that the concept of 
the Spanish nation as a political entity defined by the idea of popu-
lar sovereignty not only excludes numerous testimonies spanning 
several centuries, but also may lead to the paradoxical conclusion 
that the birth of the Spanish nation crucially depended on the legis-
lative activity of Napoleon. As stated before, it seems doubtful that 
the authors of the Constitution of 1812 echoed the will of the people 
6
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at war with the French, given the behavior of the Spanish masses 
shortly thereafter. Only two years after the enactment of the Cadiz 
Constitution, Ferdinand VII managed to revoke it without any seri-
ous popular opposition. To a significant extent, this was due to the 
effectiveness with which the most reactionary forces mobilized the 
masses against the liberals after the defeat of the French army, a fact 
that seems to contradict the understanding of Spanish identity as 
essentially liberal.7 References to liberal Spanish traditions in the 
Constitutional Preamble only prove the drafters were aware of the 
need to “nationalize” their ideas to avoid the pro-French label.
Now, if the concept of nation understood as the expression of 
popular sovereignty does not particularly help explain Spain as a 
historical reality, why has it been so widespread in recent years? Not 
because it represents more accurately the historical facts, but be-
cause it reflects the dynamics and tensions of current Spanish so-
ciety. For instance, liberal historians may use the concept in order 
to disconnect Spain from its traditional reactionary connotations 
(authoritarianism, intransigence, religious fanaticism) and to asso-
ciate it with tolerance, democracy, and the fight for freedom.8 The 
tactic is part of a larger political project of the Left whose objective 
is to reinvent Spanish identity, an effort that has been extremely suc-
cessful, according to Balfour and Quiroga (96-7). What is at stake is 
not a desire to better understand the past, but to solve the problems 
of the present and, if possible, to shape a better future. In a society 
in which the image of Spain has suffered and is still suffering the 
consequences of its association with the Franco regime, the Left has 
strived to highlight the country’s open and progressive tradition in 
order to strengthen the foundation of the new reality. Additionally, 
this liberal revisionist effort owes its success to the support it has 
received from the regional nationalist movements, which see it as 
an opportunity to diminish the historical importance of Spain, and, 
therefore, to justify their own political agenda.
Another major issue in the historical revisionism of recent 
years, equally related to the concept of nation, concerns the role that 
myths have played in the configuration of Spain. Numerous publi-
cations have shown that the writing of canonical Spanish history 
(as any national history) is not only the result of objective scientific 
investigation, but also the product of partisan biases. These stud-
7
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ies have questioned essential “truths” held by many as unquestion-
able, such as the idea of Reconquest or the imperial greatness of 
the sixteenth century; therefore, it is not surprising that they have 
aroused furious responses. The ensuing polemics are a healthy sign, 
especially if we take into account that they are perfectly justified. 
Historiography is a battlefield on which to dispute current issues 
and, under the cover of objectivity, also becomes a weapon to at-
tack or defend political positions. A review of the record suggests 
that the ideological division between conservatives and liberals 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century contributed greatly to 
the production of two markedly distinct, and often incompatible, 
historical narratives. Thus, depending on the author, the Muslim 
invasion of the peninsula is either a tragic event that endangered 
the very survival of the nation, or the beginning of one of its most 
memorable periods in arts and sciences. Also, the imperial expan-
sionism of the sixteenth century represents either the most glorious 
era in the country’s history or one of the main causes of its long and 
tragic decadence. This means that the traditional myths of the loss 
of Spain, the Reconquest, and the Empire have been opposed by the 
liberal myths of al-Andalus, the Castilian comuneros, and the al-
leged ancestral Spanish democracy destroyed by foreign dynasties.
There is, however, an element in this revisionism that needs 
“revision,” namely the identification of myth with history, for just as 
the mere denunciation of a myth as false does not invalidate the his-
torical reality that grounds it, the fact that myths represent historical 
fiction does not make them any less real either. Myths have a deci-
sive influence on the formation of a particular society, condition 
the behavior of its people, and contribute to the molding of their 
identity. They are significant not so much because of their allegedly 
faithful interpretation of the past, but because they reveal strategies 
to confront the present and ultimately contribute to shape the fu-
ture. Thus, how they relate to the idea of objective truth (historical 
events that can be proven scientifically), “is less relevant than the 
purpose and intention they serve” (Kamen x). Whether myths are 
true or not is not as relevant as whether or not they are effective.
Let us consider, for instance, the concept of Reconquest, widely 
acknowledged as one of the foundational myths of the Spanish na-
tion. Whether Pelayo’s intention in Covadonga was to initiate a pro-
8
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cess that would culminate in the expulsion of the Muslims from the 
peninsula is highly debatable, if not plainly false.9 The same can be 
said about the myth that connected the kings of León with their 
Visigothic peers as if united by an uninterrupted continuum, or 
about the reductionist interpretation of the tensions and confronta-
tions in the peninsula during the Middle Ages as a single conflict 
between native Christians and foreign Muslims. We all know that 
these myths are false in historical terms. However, we have to ac-
knowledge as a truth that the Christians responsible for elaborating 
those myths, fictitious as they may be, managed to impose them 
effectively as a reality, contributing to fashion the character of an 
entity that in time came to be known as Spain.10 This is a fact, not 
a myth. Consequently, if we accept that Spain is a historical real-
ity, whose identity has been shaped in a particular fashion through 
time, it seems problematic to speak of the “Spanish Muslims” of the 
Middle Ages. First, it is highly debatable that Spain existed at that 
time. However, even if we agree that Spain indeed existed in the 
Middle Ages as the idealized memory of a past to be recovered, or, 
in other words, as the myth, fashioned by clerics and jurists of a 
Visigothic Hispania united under one monarch and one religion 
and used by the Christian kingdoms “para cimentar su legitimidad” 
‘to cement their legitimacy’ (Álvarez Junco 40), is it justified to say 
that this myth included the Muslims? Positively not.11 Hence, if we 
speak of Muslim Spain, which concept of Spain are we using? That 
of a country shaped (as it was) by exclusionary myths that incited to 
expel the Muslim invaders, or rather that of a tolerant and inclusive 
society that seems to reflect, not the past, but our current desires 
and sensitivity? In any case, it is clear that we should not confuse 
the historical concept of Spain with the geographical concept of the 
Iberian Peninsula.12
Evidently, I am not implying hereby that Spanish history devel-
oped the way it did because of teleological determinism. Spain could 
have constituted itself as a nation in many different ways: as a politi-
cal entity encompassing the entire Iberian Peninsula; as the product 
of the union between Castile and Portugal; as a nation with three 
religions and two languages, or five languages and three religions; 
as a centralized, federal, authoritarian, tolerant, fanatic, or demo-
cratic country…. However, among the many possible outcomes, the 
9
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Christians who monopolized the concept of Spain forged a country 
with specific characteristics defined by a culture that was Latin and 
a religion that was Christian; a country, also, where purity of blood 
became a national obsession.13 Spanish liberals at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century did not like this country, and consequently 
they proceeded to redefine it, that is, to elaborate a series of alterna-
tive national myths. To the “foreign absolutism” of the Hapsburgs, 
they opposed the “democratic spirit” of medieval Spanish fueros, 
as well as the myth of the Castilian comuneros, who, in their opin-
ion, defended the popular sovereignty that had defined Spain from 
time immemorial.14 They also argued that “Spanish Muslims” of the 
Middle Ages formed an open and tolerant society subsequently de-
stroyed by Christian religious fanaticism, in a version of the myth 
where Christians and Muslims seemed to reflect the Conservatives 
and Liberals of nineteenth-century Spain. Clearly, these revamped 
myths are as false as those of Pelayo, the Reconquest, or the Visig-
oths. The historical revisionism of nineteenth-century liberals re-
veals above all a strong will to create a new country. This desire 
shaped their image of an ideal society which, while located in the 
past, reflected a project for the future.15
In addition to the traditional and liberal concepts of Spain, a 
new interpretation of the country’s identity—exotic Spain—emerg-
es in the eighteenth century and reaches international popularity 
in the Romantic period. Although all three images allegedly reflect 
intrinsic qualities of the Spanish character, it is clear that all of them 
are products of specific historical circumstances. The traditional in-
terpretation of Spanish identity that prevailed during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries originated in the confrontation with Jews 
and Muslims and proposed a reductionist definition of Spain as ex-
clusively Christian. The Reconquest and a political project to “re-
establish” the old kingdom of the Visigoths were its foundational 
myths. This interpretation motivated the end of Muslim political 
power in the Iberian Peninsula, justified the expulsion of religious 
minorities, and taking the war-like impulse beyond the confines 
of the peninsula, created the first universal empire in history. The 
Spanish identity derived from these events was associated with reli-
gious intransigency and fanaticism, as well as with the restraint and 
aloofness characteristic of dominant groups. Testimonial accounts 
10
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from the sixteenth and seventeenth century, whether coming from 
foreigners or nationals, apologists or detractors, describe the Span-
iards as proud and serious, intolerant, frugal, phlegmatic, and re-
served.
When Spain lost its political hegemony to France at the begin-
ning of the eighteenth century and experienced a cultural invasion 
of French fashions, the defensive reaction that occurred contributed 
to the construction of what I have called the “exotic” image of Spain. 
To counter the Spanish elites’ tendency to imitate French customs, 
some members of the aristocracy sought the most genuine expres-
sion of Spain in environments as removed from the upper class as 
possible: not only among the lower and ignorant people of the cities, 
but also among the marginal groups of the majos, gypsies, and bull-
fighters.16 The Spanish character so conceived was based in radical 
opposition to all things French: if French culture occupied a central 
position all over Europe, Spanish culture ought to be found at the 
margins; if France monopolized the concept of high culture, Spain 
should be associated with popular culture; if France meant sophis-
tication, Spain should mean simplicity and roughness; if France was 
civilized, Spain primitive; if France logical, Spain passionate. This 
image, which appears in numerous literary works from that time, 
was disseminated all over Europe by romantic writers. The twofold 
impulse—nationalistic and exotic—explains its success. The identi-
fication of Spain with Andalusia, flamenco, gypsies, and bullfighting 
is still prevalent today and its popularity does not appear to be wan-
ing. Carmen may be its most representative symbol.
The exotic image of Spain should not be confused with the tra-
ditional image of the previous centuries. Both coexisted in the nine-
teenth century and both worked against the modernization of the 
country. The ilustrados, well aware of the problem, attempted several 
strategies to overcome the alleged opposition between “Spain” and 
“modern.” However, it was not until the Napoleonic invasion that the 
liberal patriots understood the need to root their progressive ideas 
in the Spanish tradition if they wanted to avoid their association 
with the enemy. We should not forget that Napoleon justified his 
Spanish invasion as an opportunity to modernize the country, and, 
for that reason, received the support of many progressive-minded 
Spaniards. In this context, the Discurso Preliminar ‘Preamble’ to the 
11
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Constitution of 1812 reflects a revolutionary approach to the prob-
lem, not only because Spain was defined as a political entity based 
on the novel ideas of national sovereignty and freedom, but also 
because those ideas were supposed to connect with the most au-
thentic Spanish tradition. The drafter of the Constitution, reflecting 
the liberal version of Spanish history circulating at the time, pro-
posed that Spaniards had been free from time immemorial and had 
always endeavored to limit royal authority with democratic laws. 
It was only after the arrival of a foreign dynasty in the sixteenth 
century and the defeat of the freedom-fighter comuneros—who rep-
resented tradition—that royal absolutism was imposed, a form of 
government foreign to national traditions (104).
The audacity of this indictment against three centuries of Span-
ish history is hard to exaggerate. Its foundational significance is 
comparable only to the medieval project that advocated the restora-
tion of a Visigothic Spain united in one God and one King after the 
defeat of the Muslim invaders.17 In fact, the disconnection with the 
reality of its time was just as conspicuous, since both of them were 
born not so much as reflections of the present but as visionary proj-
ects for the future. As a gesture hose goal was to create a new reality, 
this new approach included an intense mythical activity. 
 The liberal project dating from the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century, as seen in the Preamble to the Constitution 
of 1812 and in numerous poems, dramas, and newspaper articles, 
coherently presents Spanish identity as fundamentally egalitarian 
and democratic.18 According to this interpretation, Spaniards had 
governed themselves through consensual agreements until foreign 
dynasties introduced royal absolutism. Consequently, the most au-
thentic Spain was not the Spain of Charles V and Phillip II but the 
Spain of those who opposed them in defense of popular freedom: 
the Castilian comuneros and the Aragonese who died in defense 
of their fueros, Padilla, Bravo, and Maldonado, Bishop Acuña, Di-
ego de Heredia, and Juan de Lanuza. This explains why during the 
Liberal Triennium, secret societies and revolutionary publications 
extolled their memory with hagiographic fervor, organized events 
to restore their reputation, and created symbols and traditions to 
perpetuate their legacy.19 
The mythical activity, however, extended well beyond those 
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years and was strengthened through the writings of exiled liberals, 
who identified with all the groups excluded from the Spanish na-
tion-building project due to their religious beliefs or ideas. In an ar-
ticle published in 1825 in Ocios de españoles emigrados, Basque exile 
Pablo de Mendíbil declared that he personally identified not with 
Christian Spain, heir of the Reconquest, an inquisitorial and fanatic 
society in his opinion, but with the tolerant and cultured society of 
“los árabes nuestros abuelos” ‘our forefathers, the Arabs’ (299). The 
idealization of al-Andalus as a multicultural society where three cul-
tures and religions coexisted in harmony became one of the foun-
dational myths of Spanish liberalism, together with the image of 
Castilian comuneros as advocates of the common people and of the 
medieval fueros as the embodiment of Spain’s democratic spirit.20
For almost two centuries, conservatives and liberals forged two 
exclusionary visions of Spain, each with a unique interpretation of 
Spanish history, each with distinct myths, symbols, and heroes.21 
The great success of the transition to democracy and the Constitu-
tion of 1978 resided in the ability to overcome this division, to build 
bridges and create a common national project. This middle ground 
allowed the political viability of a liberal Constitution for the first 
time in Spanish history, a Constitution that, on its thirty-year an-
niversary, earned the explicit endorsement of the major political 
parties, both from the Left and the Right. This is not to say that the 
Constitution has provided an answer to all the country’s problems.
The most critical challenge Spain faces at this moment arises 
from the flirting with separatism by regional nationalist parties (the 
third key element in the transition process). In fact, if we ignore 
the anachronistic nostalgia exhibited by some irrelevant far-right 
groups, the only serious challenge to the Constitution comes from 
that camp. When I speak of serious challenges, I do not imply the 
possible amendments of secondary issues or minor aspects of the 
text. What I imply is the questioning of the text’s legislative author-
ity, the defense of the right of some regions to secede, the refusal 
to recognize the sovereignty of the Spanish people over the entire 
national territory. The challenge concerns the Left in particular as, 
for the first time in history, Spaniards have been able to build a pro-
gressive society based on freedom and tolerance, neutralizing the 
conservative tendencies of an important part of the population. The 
13
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strength of the consensual approach that defined the transition to 
democracy resided in the creation of a common ground where the 
majority of Spaniards felt included. However, as a reality based on 
agreements, its nature is fragile. Just as the Right has the responsi-
bility to avoid a recurrent tendency in Spanish history to political 
intolerance and dictatorship, so is the Left responsible for neutral-
izing the opposed tendency toward fragmentation and social insta-
bility. It is up to the Left to demonstrate that they are capable of 
defending a viable model of Spain different from the one that has 
monopolized the idea of the country until recently. What is at stake 
is to prove that despite what conservative groups may claim, the 
alternative to traditional Spain is not the anti-Spanish zeal of those 
who seek to undermine or destroy it, but a nation based on plural-
ism and respect for differences.
Another pending issue in today’s Spain is the lack of a distinct 
image to represent it. Traditional Spain immediately evokes images 
of mystics and conquerors, fanatical friars, and serious and proud 
people, whether true or not. Exotic Spain evokes images of gyp-
sies and bandits, bullfighters and guitars, violence and unleashed 
passions, spontaneity and primitivism. However, neither the Spain 
of the Reconquest and the Empire, nor the Spain of Carmen and 
Lagartijo does justice to the country’s current reality. The inclusive 
and dynamic Spain of today needs to develop an image that more 
accurately reflects its nature. So far, the most successful attempts 
made towards this purpose, such as the films of Pedro Almodóvar 
and Juan José Bigas Luna, rely too heavily on what may be called 
a modernization of the old exotic image: a perpetuation of exotic 
tropes framed by a modern and postmodern sensitivity. Evidence 
suggests that Spaniards, regardless of their political persuasion, 
have internalized the exotic image to such an extent that they tend 
to legitimize it even when attempting to change it. The creation of 
a new image more attuned to the new reality of the country is still 
pending.22 
In the eighties, the institutional support of the PSOE to Spanish 
cinema (to Almodóvar in particular) suggests that the socialist gov-
ernment was already aware that in addition to laws, the new situ-
ation required the creation of new images, myths, and symbols.23 
However, the creation of myths, necessary as it is, should not inter-
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fere with the writing of History. As I indicated above, myths belong 
to a different reality than facts. Whether we like it or not, the history 
of Spain has followed a path that we have to acknowledge and ac-
cept, although it does not mean that the country should perpetuate 
its errors. The Spain of the future will become what Spaniards want 
it to be like, but this willful disposition should not be a key element 
in the interpretation of the past. The radical discord among histo-
rians reveals that, far from being a dispassionate activity, Spanish 
historiography is still subject to the whims of often-incompatible 
political projects. History writing is thus confused with national 
myth making. This proves that the conciliatory mood that guided 
the writing of the 1978 Constitution still faces important challenges. 
Spain must preserve the spirit of consensus and broaden its scope 
to ensure an open and stable society. The unilateral denunciation 
of the transition pacts as interim responses to a particular situation 
may provoke a falling back to the confrontational dynamics that 
have so often characterized modern Spanish history.
The growing political tension experienced by the country since 
the second term of the Aznar administration is perhaps responsible 
for the recent proliferation of books on Spain. To this regard, need-
less to say, the articles included in this volume do not aspire to pro-
vide an exhaustive examination of such a complex subject, but they 
do explore some of its most polemic elements. In general, they cen-
ter on two major themes: the conflictive relationship of Spain with 
its internal and external Others, and the need of the country to find 
an updated image more attuned to its current reality.
In “Uses of a Myth: al-Andalus,” Serafín Fanjul explores a 
highly charged subject that touches upon the foundational myths 
of both traditional and liberal Spain. According to the author, in 
the mid-nineties there was a significant change of attitude in the 
Spanish press, shifting from coverage of the Middle East conflict 
usually favorable to Israel to a generalized pro-Arab position. This 
change was also experienced by other European countries, but in 
Spain it implied a reassessment of its Islamic past that in the last 
twenty years has gotten out of hand in its blatant disregard for the 
historical record. According to Fanjul, the idealization of a mythical 
and entirely imaginary al-Andalus needs to be reassessed by a seri-
ous and scientific analysis of the historical facts.
15
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Nil Santiáñez’s “Habitus, Heterotopia, and Endocolonialism in 
Early Spanish Literary Fascism” is also concerned with the com-
plex relations between Spain and the Islamic world, although he 
focuses on Spain’s most recent colonial past. While Fanjul criticizes 
a deformed interpretation of the historical record, Santiáñez tracks 
down the beginnings of Spanish fascism in the Rif war and warns 
about the danger of colonialism turning into endocolonialism. Ac-
cording to Santiáñez, the textual appropriation of the Moroccan 
landscape not only anticipated the military occupation of the coun-
try, but, transferred to Spain, contributed to the development of the 
Civil War of 1936. Santiáñez examines the work of fascist author Ra-
fael Sánchez Mazas and shows how the techniques used to describe 
the Moroccan Other are later employed to depict Spanish workers, 
intellectuals and politicians. The colonial mission in Africa is char-
acterized as a rehearsal of the mission that Franco would carry out 
in Spain. This suggests that the desire to dominate the Other can 
easily translate into militarism and, therefore, colonization can turn 
against its practitioners.
In “The Basque Country: The Heart of Spain, a Part of Spain, 
or Somewhere Else Altogether,” Paddy Woodworth reminds us that 
all nationalisms rely on myths and that both Spanish and Basque 
nationalisms are no exemption. However, what makes Euskadi dif-
ferent is the persistence of an attitude that identifies negotiation 
with treason, and therefore hinders the possibility of agreements. As 
Woodworth points out, those who attempt to move to the middle 
ground are ostracized. Nevertheless, the author insists, Basque real-
ity is quite multilayered, which makes him think that any solution to 
the conflict can only occur through dialogue and consensus.
The creation of a new image of Spain better adapted to its cur-
rent reality informs the rest of the contributions. In “Spain Rein-
carnated: Julio Medem’s Caótica Ana and the New Media(tion) 
in the World,” Susan Martin-Márquez examines the new role that 
Spain seeks to perform in the international arena. According to 
Martin-Márquez, personalities like Judge Garzón (prosecutor of 
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet) and Spanish Prime Minister 
Rodríguez Zapatero (instrumental in the creation of the Alliance 
of Civilizations) seek to replace the United States as leaders in the 
fight for international justice. This grandiose project, however, may 
16
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be weakened by the lack of political will to face the country’s own 
past. On the other hand, according to Gonzalo Navajas, a certain 
degree of amnesia may not be altogether bad, especially if remem-
brance causes growing tensions. In “The Spanish Case for Europe: 
the Power of Cultural Identity,” Navajas considers the transition to 
democracy as a turning point when the country deliberately chose 
to leave behind—although not necessarily to forget—a confronta-
tional history of civil strife and authoritarianism. Ever since, Spain 
has built a modern, diverse, and tolerant society fully integrated 
within Europe. Hopefully, the country’s opening to the world, both 
through Europe and Latin America, will assuage the tension of its 
internal conflicts and inspire a broader and universal outlook for 
its citizens.
Cristina Sánchez Conejero ponders the meaning of “Spanish” 
in an increasingly interconnected world. In “Spaniwood? English 
Language Spanish Films since the 1990’s,” Conejero analyzes recent 
English language production by Spanish directors, to highlight the 
inadequacy of national categories applied to the global film industry. 
If a film like Amenábar’s The Others received several Goya awards 
from the Spanish Academy of Cinema, despite being in English and 
having foreign actors, does it mean that we should attempt a more 
inclusive definition of national cinema or should we simply study 
film as a global phenomenon?
Finally, Andrés Zamora’s article, “A Vindication of the Span-
ish Mother: Maternal Images in the Filmic Make-over of the Na-
tion,” examines how the long duration of Franco’s dictatorship af-
fected the perception of Spanish identity. According to Zamora, the 
chronological pervasiveness of the regime contributed to the confu-
sion between temporal and essential qualities conflating its char-
acteristics with that of the country. Spanish films of the seventies 
developed metaphors of the country through repressive images of 
violence and intolerance. This association began to weaken after the 
dictator’s death. Zamora examines maternal figures in Spanish films 
of the last twenty years and shows that there is a distinct tendency to 
exorcize the past through the creation of mother figures that repre-
sent polymorphic perversions of the traditional maternal ideal.
17
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Notes
1 None of these changes would have occurred so rapidly had it not been for 
the social dynamics in existence during Franco’s dictatorship. In “Examen de 
conciencia,” an essay published in El furgón de cola, Juan Goytisolo points out 
that in the 1960s, for the first time in history, thanks to the double flow of for-
eign tourists and Spanish migrant workers, Spaniards learned to assimilate the 
economic values of industrial nations, “y todo ello … bajo un sistema originari-
amente creado para impedirlo” ‘and all this … under a system originally created 
to prevent it’ (261).
2 This reaction reveals a strong nationalistic component. Bruce King considers 
that nationalism “aims at group solidarity, cultural purity, and dignity, a typical-
ity in the lower orders (worker or peasant) and rejection of cosmopolitan upper 
classes, intellectuals and others likely to be influenced by foreign ideas” (42).
3 I provide a full account of this phenomenon in España exótica: la formación 
de la imagen española moderna.
4 According to Pérez Garzón, the Statute of Bayonne strongly influenced the 
Cadiz Constitution and all subsequent Spanish liberal constitutions of the 
nineteenth century. This affinity, however, was not acknowledged “porque le 
quedó la marca de ser un texto ‘afrancesado’ y eso pasó a significar tanto como 
traidor a la patria” ‘because the text’s characterization as pro-French implied 
that it was a traitor to the country’ (130).
5 See for example Cristóbal de Villalón, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Diego de 
Saavedra y Fajardo, Francisco de Quevedo, Félix Lope de Vega, Benito Jeróni-
mo Feijóo, José Cadalso, and Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos. Miguel Antonio de 
Gándara claims in 1759 that “no tengo más patria, más partido, más paysanage 
ni más sangre que España, España y España” ‘I have no other fatherland, no 
other allegiance, no other country, and no other blood than Spain, Spain, and 
Spain’ (2).
6 Santiago Muñoz also affirms that the Bayonne Statute left a decisive mark on 
the Cadiz Constitution: not only did the former mobilize the constitutional-
ist impulse among liberals, but more importantly—and similarly to what hap-
pened to the Cadiz text—its supporters considered that the document should 
respect Spanish traditions and institutions (32).
7 Examples abound in accounts by liberal writers like José Somoza (461) and 
León López y Espila (20-3). In El risco de la Pesqueruela, for instance, Somo-
za reports that as soon as Ferdinand VII returned to Spain in 1814, he heard 
turmoil in the streets and saw a procession, directed by the clergy, carrying a 
portrait of the king and shouting “Viva la religión y mueran los impíos” ‘Long 
live our religion and death to the impious’ (461). The author recounts how the 
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mob attempted to storm his house and how he escaped to safety thanks to the 
intervention of some of his servants.
8 Álvarez Junco begins Mater Dolorosa by stating that his book tries to un-
derstand the problems confronted by Spanish identity, “una cultura y un sen-
timiento de los que se sienten distanciados una parte—mayor o menor, según 
las estimaciones, pero innegablemente suficiente como para generar conflic-
tos—de los ciudadanos del Estado español” ‘a culture and a feeling with which 
a segment of the citizens of the Spanish State—a greater or smaller percentage, 
depending on the estimates, but without a doubt significant enough to cause 
friction—are unable to identify’ (18). Although the author speaks of “under-
standing,” he tries to solve what he perceives as a problem. His study seeks to 
configure an idea of Spain that is less conflictive, more appealing to all Span-
iards, and more attuned to the country’s new reality.
 9 According to traditional Spanish historiography, Pelayo was a Visigothic no-
bleman who commanded the first Christian military victory against the Mus-
lim invaders in the battle of Covadonga. He is considered to be the initiator of 
the Christian “Reconquest” of the Iberian Peninsula.
10 In España y las Españas, Luis González Antón offers a detailed presentation 
of the origin and evolution of this myth.
11 In the foreword to the second edition of La realidad histórica de España 
(1962), Américo Castro points out that, when speaking of Spaniards, we have 
to understand a group of people from northern Hispania who, back in the 
eighth and ninth centuries, “comenzó por dotar de dimensión político-social 
su condición de creyentes cristianos, y por eso se llamaron a sí mismos ‘cris-
tianos,’ un hecho nuevo y sin igual en la vida de Occidente” ‘began to provide 
a socio-political dimension to their being Christian believers, which is why they 
began to call themselves ‘Christians,’ a new and unprecedented event in the 
West’ (xx).
12 The lack of coherence that characterizes any discussion on the subject is 
worrisome. It is present even in authors who are quite perceptive otherwise. For 
instance, Balfour and Quiroga declare that one cannot speak of a differentiated 
idea of Spain and Spanish identity until the sixteenth century (104), but they 
lament the exclusion of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Spain from “the canon of 
national culture” by conservative historians (101). If Spain did not exist as such 
in the Middle Ages, how can we speak of “Islamic Spain”? Should we not rather 
refer to the Muslims of al-Andalus or of the Iberian Peninsula? Discussions on 
the subject elude any logic: to question that medieval Muslims were Spanish is 
perceived not as an argument that can be logically proven or refuted, but as a 
political position that needs to be condemned.
13 Anthony Marx affirms that nationalism in the core countries of Western Eu-
19
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rope “was built, more or less purposely or successfully, not only in the context 
of, but also on the back of, fanatical religious passion and conflict” (193). Ac-
cording to Marx, Spain’s “early efforts at exclusionary nation-building perhaps 
provided a template for others later but proved premature for Spain herself, and 
it failed to take hold” (195).
14 Fueros is the Spanish designation of a compilation of laws, especially at a 
local or regional level. Comuneros are Spaniards who revolted against King 
Charles V, to defend local interests.
15 A similar historical revisionism occurred in other European countries at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. According to Leersen, to counter the 
claim that some French aristocratic families made about being descendants of 
the Franks, some post-revolutionary historians interpreted French history “as 
a long and radically ethnic conflict translated in terms of social classes—the 
conquered Gauls passing on the ideal of liberty and tribal democracy to the 
communes, the roturiers, the cities and Tiers état; the Franks imposing feu-
dalism and the aristocratic values of the ancien régime” (46). This caused an 
identification of the French people “with nos ancêtres les Gaulois (as opposed to 
Montesquieu’s earlier ‘nos pères, les anciens Germains’)” (46).
16 The majos were people from the lower classes of Spanish society who were 
recognized by their distinctive clothing and behavior, as seen in the paintings 
of Francisco de Goya.
17 Susan Martin-Márquez calls this double “invention” of Spain “First-Wave” 
and “Second-Wave Nation Building” (12-27).
18 On 27 April 1814, La abeja madrileña claimed that it was in Covadonga and 
in Sobrarbe where the social pact of Spaniards began, “pues las leyes de Castilla 
y Vizcaya, con los fueros de Navarra y Aragón, componían una constitución tan 
sabia y perfecta, qual vemos y admiramos en la promulgada en Cádiz” ‘since 
the laws of Castile and Biscay, together with the fueros of Navarra and Aragon, 
made up such a wise and perfect Constitution as the one we see and admire 
now enacted in Cadiz” (383). Similar statements abound in liberal newspapers 
of the time; see for instance Semanario patriótico (6 Jul. 1809): 153-4; Redactor 
General de España (16 Nov. 1813): 61; La colmena (25 Apr. 1820): 90; Barto-
lomé Gallardo’s Alocución patriótica (1820): 19; Minerva Nacional (213-5); El 
eco de Padilla (17 Aug. 1821): 51; El Zurriago 6 (1822): 2; and El Espectador (28 
Mar. 1823): 352.
19 Some members of Masonic lodges decided to break away from them in or-
der to establish a new association heir to the comuneros. According to Antonio 
Alcalá Galiano, liberal Bartolomé Gallardo claimed to have found proof in an-
cient documents that the comuneros had formed a kind of secret society with 
symbols resembling those of the Masons and on that ground he designed a 
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project whereby the Spanish masons would have new grades alluding to those 
who fought in the War of the Comunidades (170).
20 Other articles included in Ocios reveal how early nineteenth-century liberals 
identified themselves with medieval Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula. Like-
wise, during his exile, José Joaquín de Mora published a Cuadros de la historia 
de los árabes (1826), characterizing them as wise and tolerant and declaring 
he considered them “parte de nuestra familia” ‘part of our family’ (VI). The 
identification with the Arabs of Medieval Iberia is documented as early as the 
eighteenth century, but it was not as unanimously upheld among the liberals as 
the identification with the comuneros. I provide a more detailed account of the 
positive image of the Arabs among Enlightened Spaniards in Guerras literarias 
del XVIII español.
21 Eric Hobswam points out that when confronted with a new situation, mem-
bers of a society may resort to the past “to construct invented traditions of a 
novel type for quite novel purposes” (6).
22 Different from the traditional and liberal image, identified with their respec-
tive groups, the exotic image has been accepted as authentic by Spaniards of all 
ideologies, although, of course, each group interprets it differently. See chapter 
II of Torrecilla´s España exótica.
23 The Second Republic myths, which the Left embraced for decades, recall 
a time of radical confrontation that cannot adequately reflect the conciliatory 
and inclusive climate of the new Spain.
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